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EVIDENCE - Sexual Abuse of Children: The Justification
For a New Hearsay Exception
INTRODUCTION
Child sexual abuse has accelerated into public awareness dur-
ing the past five years.1 The legal system failed to contemplate
the emergence of this relatively recent development. The limited
evidence available in child sex abuse cases has caused an erratic
application of the present hearsay exceptions.2
This Note will explore the evidentiary problem of admitting
a victim's out-of-court statements in the prosecution of a child sex
abuse crime. The judiciary, in recognition of the limited available
evidence in such crimes,' has contorted the present hearsay ex-
ceptions to allow the admittance of the child's out-of-court state-
ments.' In an effort to prevent further uncertainty in the admittance
of a child's hearsay statement, the Colorado legislature has enacted
a statute providing for a new hearsay exception.5 The assessment
presented by this Note of the Colorado statute will demonstrate
its compatability with the traditional hearsay exceptions and its
constitutionality as determined by the latest Supreme Court in-
terpretation of the confrontation clause.
BACKGROUND
A. The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions
Hearsay has been defined as an out-of-court statement that is
introduced for the truth contained in it." This out-of-court state-
ment may be oral or written" or in the form of conduct.8 Courts
generally have held hearsay testimony inadmissible," predicated
on the want of cross-examination of the declarant"° and the lack
of any opportunity on the part of the jury to observe the demeanor
1. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 177, 178
(1983). See also Galdstein Investigating Child Sexual Exploitation: Law Enforcement Role, FBI LAW ENFORCE-
MENT BULLETIN, 22, 26 (Jan. 1984).
2. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
3. Id.
4. See infra notes 50-64 and accompanying text.
5. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129 (Supp. 1985).
6. Key Life Insurance Co. v. Byrd, 312 So. 2d 450 (Miss. 1975); FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
7. Kelly v. State, 278 So. 2d 400 (Miss. 1973); Spears v. State, 241 So. 2d 148 (Miss. 1970); FED. R.
Evi. 801(a)(1).
8. See Fells v. State, 345 So. 2d 618 (Miss. 1977) (out-of-court identification); FED. R. EvID. 801(a)(2).
9. Pevey v. Alexander Pool Co., 244 Miss. 25, 31, 139 So. 2d 847, 850 (1967) (citing 20 Am. Jur. Evidence
§ 452). See also FED. R. EVID. 802 ("Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to Statutory Authority or by Act of Congress.").
10. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 154 (1970). "Declarant" will be used throughout the Note denoting
the one who has made the out-of-court statement.
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of the declarant contemporaneously with his enunciation of the
statement. 11
This judicial rule prohibiting hearsay evidence is not absolute
but is, of course, riddled with exceptions. 2 These well recognized
exceptions have as their premise necessity and a guarantee of trust-
worthiness.13 In criminal proceedings, the creation of a new ex-
ception that is found to meet the requisites of necessity and
trustworthiness will often raise questions of compatibility with
the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation.'
B. Compatibility of the Confrontation Clause with the
Hearsay Exceptions
The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment reads, "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
be confronted with the witnesses against him ... ."'5 Literally
taken, the confrontation clause could be argued to require as con-
stitutionally indispensable the presence of the witness before the
tribunal. 6 This untenable interpretation' 7 would vitiate any ex-
ception to the hearsay rule as unconstitutional. 8 However, this
prima facie conflict was confronted in California v. Green,9 where
the Supreme Court stated that the hearsay rule with its exceptions
and the confrontation clause are generally designed to protect simi-
lar values.2"
In Green, a witness's previous out-of-court statement made at
a preliminary hearing was admitted pursuant to state statute over
an objection to the statute as a violation of the confrontation
clause.2 The Supreme Court intimated that the "Confrontation
Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant's out-of-court state-
1I. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43
(1895)).
12. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 62; E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 245 (3d ed. 1984); see
also FED. R. EVID. 803. A nonexclusive list of twenty-three exceptions to the rule against hearsay is recog-
nized by the federal courts. Id.
13. Hercules, Inc. v. Walters, 434 So. 2d 723, 727 (Miss. 1983); cf FED. R. EvIo. 803 (24). The residual
exception of the federal rule is premised on necessity and probative value.
14. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI: The confrontation clause was made applicable to the states via the fourteenth
amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
16. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TReIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1397 (1. Chadbourn rev. 1974) (hereinafter
cited as WIGMORE, EVIDENCE].
17. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63.
18. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
19. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
20. Id. at 155.
21. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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ments, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and sub-
ject to full and effective cross-examination."22
This requisite cross-examination was becoming an impractical
confrontation clause mandate23 until the decision pronounced in
Ohio v. Roberts.2" In Roberts, the Supreme Court held admissi-
ble the testimony of an unavailable witness given at the defen-
dant's preliminary hearing. "5 The confrontation clause was
interpreted to restrict the range of admissible hearsay in two
fashions. First, the exception must arise from the establishment
of necessity and second, it must be supported by indicia of relia-
bility. "7 Satisfaction of the requirement of necessity entails that
the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavail-
ability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against
the defendant. "8 However, upon a showing of unavailability, a
finding of indicia of reliability is required, and is determined ade-
quate when the statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay ex-
ception.29 Absent this characteristic, a search for particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness must be undertaken."0 The Court
in Ohio v. Roberts found the requisite indicia of reliability predi-
cated on the fact that the prior testimony was subject to what
amounted, in effect, to cross-examination."
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF A VICTIM'S HEARSAY STATEMENTS IN
CHILD SEX ABUSE CASES
A. The Need and Reliability of.the Statements
In the usual child sex abuse case there exists a relationship of
trust between the perpetrator and the victim.32 In this relation-
ship of trust a sexual assault may not give rise to an immediate
22. Id. at 158 (emphasis added). "[N]either evidence nor reason convinces us that contemporaneous cross-
examination before the ultimate trier of fact is so much more effective than subsequent examination that it
must be made the touchstone of the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 161. The Court chose not to consider what
constitutes full and effective cross-examination in affording confrontation clause compliance.
23. Cf. Dutoon v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) Cross-examination could not have possibly revealed unrelia-
ble the hearsay statement. It was the reliability of the hearsay which got it over the confrontation hurdle. Younger.
Confrontation. 24 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1984).
24. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
25. Id.
26. id. at 65.
27. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65, 66 (1980).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 66.
30. Id.
31. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 70, 71-73. The Court went further to dispel any suggestion left by its
decision in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) that the opportunity to cross-examine at the preliminary
hearing-when absent actual cross-examination -satisfies the confrontation clause. The Court chose not to reach
a decision on this issue, for in Green, as well as, in effect, Roberts, the defendants exercised their right of
cross-examination at the preliminary hearing.
32. Summit. The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Svndrome. 7 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 177 (1983).
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complaint." The voicing of the complaint may be delayed because
the abused child may not comprehend that the invasion is wrong-
ful."4 Moreover, threats of retaliation by physical harm, black-
mail or peer pressure, the "pledge of silence," obedience to the
authority figure, 5 and guilt or fear of exposure all can establish
a virtually tight, impervious bond between the accused and the
victim, delaying the disclosure of the offense. Dissipation of any
physical evidence precipitates from this delay of disclosure. 7 A
further evidentiary problem arising from this relationship of trust
is the usual absence of any third party witness.38
However, once disclosure has finally been made, the child is
often met with disbelief. 9 This disbelief is supported by an ex-
amination of the complaining child." Young children often fail
to distinguish between subjective and objective experiences, be-
tween events they dream or imagine and events that happen in
the external world. 1 In affirming this disbelief of a child's in-
criminating statement, one court has intimated that childhood
illusions and vagaries are oftentimes bizarre. 2 Furthermore, some
clinical specialists tend to reinforce the comforting belief that most
sexual abuse complaints can be dismissed as fantasy, confusion,
or a displacement of the child's own wish for power or seductive
conquest. 3
However, most nonabused children are not knowledgeable in
the details of sexual encounters." When a young child can relate
explicit details of sexual activity, the validity of the communica-
tion rises to a level of greater acceptability." Therefore, the more
illogical and incredible the initiation scene appears to adults, the
33. S. SGROIA, HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL INTERVENTION IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 114 (5th printing 1983).
See also Reifen, Legal Protection of Children in Sexual Assault Cases, CHILD ABUSE 141, 149 (A. Carmi
& H. Zimrin 1984).
34. See People v. Baker, 251 Mich. 322, 232 N.W. 381 (1930) A child would have no sense of outrage
at such acts by her own father. id.
35. Reference made to the offender.
36. Burgess, Child Sex Initiation Rings, 51 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY I1I, 114 (Jan. 1981).
See also S. SGROIA, supra, note 33, at 115-21 (stating similar reasons for delay); Summit, supra note 32, at
186 (most ongoing sexual abuse is never disclosed, at least not outside the immediate family).
37. Summit, supra note 32, at 179.
38. Summit, supra note 32, at 179 (usually the invasion discreetly occurs when the victim and the perpetra-
tor are alone).
39. Summit, supra note 32, at 186-88.
40. Summit, supra note 32, at 179.
41. Brown v. United States, 152 F.2d 138 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
42. Robinson v. State, 235 Miss. 100, 108 So. 2d 583 (1959) (where the accusation of a two and one-half
year old child did not support an admission by silence).
43. Summit, supra note 32. at 179.
44. S. SGROIA, supra note 33, at 43. See also Kempe, Incest and Other Forms of Sexual Abuse, THE BAT-
TERED CHILD 204 (C. Kempe & R. Heifer ed. 1980).
45. S. SGROIA, supra note 33. at 39-79.
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more likely it is that the child's description accurately recounts
an actual experience."6
Furthermore, a child's statement may prove more accurate when
made nearer to the alleged assault. This follows from the fact that
a child's retentive capabilities dramatically decline with the passage
of time. 7
The forbidding atmosphere of the courtroom and the embarass-
ing questions posed by authorities place the child witness in a
stressful environment. 8 The resultant interference with a child
witness's power of recollection and narration" often causes con-
tradictions and inconsistencies to appear in the child's testimony.
B. Application of the Spontaneous Utterance Exception
The spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule requires
that the declarant be under the excitement of the event at the time
the statement is made." In determining whether this excitement
existed contemporaneously with the making of the statement, the
demeanor," age," and mentality 3 of the victim should be consid-
ered, in addition to the lapse of time between the act and the ut-
terance. 5
The spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule has been
variedly applied in admitting a child's hearsay statement in sex
abuse cases. 5 Statements made up to twenty-four hours after the
46. Summit, supra note 32, at 179.
47. Cf. Parker, The Rights of Child Witnesses: Is the Court a Protector or Perpetrator?, 17 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 643, 670 (1981-82) ("[tlhe spontaneous statements of a child to the hospital staff are likely to be more
accurate than the child's later memory."). Id.
48. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 401 N.E.2d 360, 369 (1980) (citing Libai, The Protection
of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 977, 1021 (1969),
(quoting Hallech, Emotional Effects of Victimization, SEx BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 684 (R. Slovenko ed. 1965))).
See also Arthur, Should Children be as Equal as People?, 45 N.D.L. REV. 204, 208 (1969). "Children talk
best in their native habitat. What they say when pressure of emotion and strangeness are absent is more apt
to be true. . . ."ld.
49. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 401 N.E.2d at 369.
50. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
51. State v. Ritchey, 107 Ariz. 552, 555, 490 P.2d 558, 561 (1971) (change from a characteristically rowdy
to a subdued disposition).
52. Smith v. State, 6 Md. App. 581, 587-88, 252 A.2d 277, 281 (1969); United States v. Iron Shell, 633
F.2d 77, 86 (8th Cir. 1980).
53. State v. Wilson, 20 Or. App. 553, 554-57, 532 P.2d 825, 827-28 (1975).
54. Id.
55. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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attack have been admitted under this exception. 6 Although spon-
taneity is required, elicited statements have also fallen within this
expanding exception." In many of these cases allowing the hear-
say statements to be admitted under the spontaneous utterance ex-
ception, physical corroboration existed, reinforcing the reliability
of the statement. 8
C. Other Judicially Created Exceptions
The Mississippi Supreme Court in Williams v. State9 has ex-
pressed acceptance of the "tender years" exception stated in the
Michigan decision of People v. Mikula,6° which admitted the hear-
say testimony of a sexually abused child of "tender years" upon
a showing that the statement was "spontaneous and without indi-
cation of manufacture, and if any delay in making the complaint
is excusable insofar as it is caused by fear or other equally effec-
tive circumstances." 61
A different approach was taken by the Wisconsin court in
Bertrang v. State.62 The court admitted the statements of a sexu-
ally abused child, notwithstanding the hearsay rule, by consider-
ing the age of the child, the nature of the assault, the physical
evidence, the relationship of the child to the defendant, the con-
temporaneity and spontaneity of the assertions to the assault, the
reliability of the assertions to the assault, the reliability of the as-
sertions themselves, and the reliability of the testifying witness.63
In admitting the statements the court placed its authorization on
56. Bertrang v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 702, 184 N.W.2d 867 (1971) (admitted under res gestae, of which the
key elements are contemporaneity and spontaneity). Res gestae used in this capacity will hereinafter be referred
to as a spontaneous utterance. See, e.g., Wheeler v. United States, 211 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cit. 1953) (ten-year-old's
statement made within one hour), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1019 (1954); State v. Ritchey, 107 Ariz. 552, 490
P.2d 558 (1971) (six-year-old's statement made within 25 minutes); see also United States v. Iron Shell, 633
F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980) (nine-year-old's statement made one hour after assault), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001
(1981); People v. Stewart, 39 Colo. App. 142, 568 P.2d 65 (1977) (six-year-old girl's statement made two
hours after the attack); Smith v. State, 6 Md. App. 581, 252 A.2d 277 (1969) (four-year-old's statement given
four hours later); Cf. State v. Humnel, 132 N.J. Super. 412, 334 A.2d 52 (1975). The fact of the complaint,
absent any details, was admitted though given three years subsequent to the attack. But see Brown v. United
States, 152 F.2d 138 (D.C. Cir, 1945) (four-year-old's statement made three hours later inadmissible); Ketch-
am v. State, 240 Ind. 107, 162 N.E.2d 247 (1959) (five-year-old's statement made two hours later inadmissible).
57. Purdy v. State, 343 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847 (1977); People v. Miller, 58
Il. App. 3d 156, 373 N.E.2d 1077 (1978).
58. See State v. Boodry, 96 Ariz. 259, 394 P.2d 196 (1964); Purdy v. State, 343 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847 (1977); Smith v. State, 6 Md. App. 581, 252 A.2d 277 (1969); cf. Brown v. United
States, 152 F.2d 138 (D.C. Cir. 1945). The spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule has commonly
been applied only when there has been independent evidence of an exciting event. Id.
59. 427 So. 2d 100 (Miss. 1983). An eleven-year-old child's statements made to her sister the day follow-
ing the assault were admitted. Id.
60. 84 Mich. App. 108, 269 N.W.2d 195 (1978).
61. Williams v. State, 427 So. 2d at 102-03.
62. 50 Wis. 2d 702, 184 N.W.2d 867 (1971).
63. Id. at 708, 184 N.W.2d at 870.
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the residual hearsay exception noted in sections 908.03(24) and
908.045(6) of the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence.6 '
ANALYSIS
A. The Adequacy of the Present Exceptions as Applied
The spontaneous utterance exception has been liberally applied
to out-of-court statements of children involved in sex abuse
crimes." This application has expanded the exception to cover
statements made in a placid and calm disposition hours after the
assault." Although the court in Smith v. State acknowledged that
no emotional distress was manifest when the statement of the child
was made, it determined that upon consideration of her age the
child was under emotional strain. 8 Other courts have admitted
the child's hearsay statements only upon the admission of some
corroborating physical evidence. 9 However, in applying this re-
quirement, there is a failure to recognize the peculiar circumstances
of child sex abuse cases.
A delay in the making of the complaint by a child causes phys-
ical evidence to disappear.70 Moreover, in this crime there is the
usual absence of any third party eyewitness."' In this light, the
requirement of corroborating evidence evinces a type of "Catch
22" proposition. This "Catch 22" predicament and the liberal search
for a mental state of excitement demonstrate that the spontane-
ous utterance exception is an unacceptable means of admitting
a sexually abused child's hearsay statement.
The "tender years" exception employed in Williams v. State72
and People v. Mikula3 is equally unworkable because it does not
provide any guidelines for establishing a guarantee of trustwor-
thiness or reliability. This is a creation of a new exception which
is of questionable constitutionality.7" There is no guidance given
in searching for particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' 8
64. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 908.03(24) and 908.045(6) (West 1975). "A statement not specifically covered
by any of the foregoing exceptions but having comparable circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." Id.
These residual exceptions closely parallel sections 803(24) and 804(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
65. People v. Stewart, 39 Colo. App. 142, 568 P.2d 65 (1977).
66. Smith v. State, 6 Md. App. 581, 252 A.2d 277 (1969). But see Ketcham v. State, 240 Ind. 107. 162
N.E.2d 247 (1959); Brown v. United States, 152 F.2d 138 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
67. 6 Md. App. 581, 252 A.2d 277 (1969).
68. Id.
69. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
70. Summit, supra note 32 and accompanying text.
71. Summit, supra note 38 and accompanying text.
72. 427 So. 2d 100 (Miss. 1983).
73. 84 Mich. App. 108, 269 N.W.2d 195 (1978).
74. See supra notes 15-31 and accompanying text.
75. Guidance must be provided upon which the court's discretion in admitting the evidence may be predicated.
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Hence, many situations where the hearsay statements are admit-
ted may be found constitutionally infirm.
The Wisconsin remedy espoused in Bertrang v. State7 was not
intended to become a firmly rooted exception. The residual ex-
ceptions were provided to compensate for the seldom and unusual
circumstance where the hearsay statement is found reliable but
lies outside the commonly recognized exceptions.77 The invoca-
tion of this residual statute was to be the exception, not the rule.
The inadequacy of the present exceptions as applied to child
abuse victims' hearsay statements militates against their continued
use78 and has led the Colorado legislature to create a new excep-
tion addressing this problem:
13-25-129. Statement of child victim of unlawful sexual offense against a child or of child
abuse - hearsay exception. (1) An out-of-court statement made by a child, as child is de-
fined under the statutes which are the subject of the action, describing any act of sexual
contact, intrusion, or penetration, as defined in section 18-3-401, C.R.S., performed with,
by, or on the child declarant, not otherwise admissible by a statute or court rule which
provides an exception to the objection of hearsay, is admissible in evidence in any crimi-
nal, deliquency, or civil proceedings in which the child is a victim of an unlawful sexual
offense, as defined in section 18-3-411 (1), C.R.S., or the subject of a proceeding alleg-
ing that the child is neglected or dependent under section 19-1-104 (1) (c), C.R.S., and
an out-of-court statement by a child, as child is defined under the statutes which are the
subject of the action, describing any act of child abuse, as defined in section 18-6-401,
C.R.S., to which the child declarant was subjected, not otherwise admissible by a statute
or court rule which provides an exception to the objection of hearsay, is admissible in
evidenoe in any criminal, deliquency, or civil proceedings in which the child is a victim
of child abuse or the subject of a proceeding alleging that the child is neglected or depen-
dent under section 19-1-104 (1) (c), C.R.S., if:
(a) The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the time,
content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability; and
(b) The child either:
(I) Testifies at the proceedings; or
(II) Is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the act which is
the subject of the statement.
(2) If a statement is admitted pursuant to this section, the court shall instruct the jury
that it is for the jury to determine the weight and credit to be given the statement and
that, in making the determination, it shall consider the age and maturity of the child, the
nature of the statement, the circumstances under which the statement was made, and any
other relevant factor.
76. 50 Wis. 2d 702, 184 N.W.2d 867 (1971).
77. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. FED. R. EVID. 803(24) (advisory comment). It is intend-
ed that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances. Id.
78. But see Ketcham v. State, 240 Ind. 107, 162 N.E.2d 247 (1959), where the court stated:
We recognize that some crimes are committed and the evidence so concealed that it is sometimes im-
possible to present legal evidence to sustain a conviction, but such instances do not warrant waiving
or changing well settled principles of evidence which determine what is and what is not credible or
competent upon which the liberty or life of one charged with a crime is at stake.
Id. at 113-14, 162 N.E.2d at 250.
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(3) The proponent of the statement shall give the adverse party reasonable notice of his
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement."
B. The Constitutionality of the Colorado Statute
The Colorado statute provides guidelines for the court to de-
termine in a proceeding conducted outside the hearing of the jury
if there exists particularized indicia of reliability of the hearsay
statement.8" This search for sufficient reliability must be under-
taken whether or not the child testifies.8 And if the child is un-
available, there must be corroborative evidence of the assertion
made in the hearsay statement. 2 This appears well within the con-
frontation clause, which has been interpreted in Ohio v. Roberts"
to mandate a search for particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
only when the declarant is unavailable." Colorado is more re-
strictive in that it requires this search whether or not the declar-
ant is available, and, if not available, there must be corroborative
evidence of the statement.8"
The Colorado statute also requires the court to instruct the jury
on the weight that should be given to the statement by consider-
ing relevant factors concerning the child's mental capacity as well
as the circumstances under which the statement was made.8" This
will help to prevent any undue weight given by the jury to a child's
statement when related through an adult witness. These requisites
and considerations of the Colorado statute far exceed the confron-
tation clause interpretation espoused in Ohio v. Roberts. 7
CONCLUSION
The Colorado statutory exception to the hearsay rule of admit-
ting a sexually abused child's hearsay statement, instead of con-
torting the existing exceptions to accommodate the hearsay
statements, ' rectifies the peculiar evidentiary problems involved
79. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129 (Supp. 1985). Similar statutes have been enacted in several other states:
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460dd (1983), IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Burns Supp. 1984), MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 595.2(3) (Supp. 1984). S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-38 (Supp. 1984), UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411
(Supp. 1983), WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.120 (1982). For an analysis of the Washington statutory exception
see Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1745 (1983).
80. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-129(l)(a) (Supp. 1985).
81. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129(l)(a) and (b) (Supp. 1985).
82. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129(I)(b)(I) (Supp. 1985).
83. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
84. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
85. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129(1) (Supp. 1985).
86. Id. § 13-25-129(2) (Supp. 1985).
87. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 50-64 and accompanying text.
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in a child sex abuse crime.8 9 The statutory exception comports
with the premises of reliability and need upon which the present
hearsay exceptions are predicated.90 The need for this exception
should be recognized by other states and remedied by similar
legislation.
Darren J. LaMarca
89. See supra notes 32-49 and accompanying text.
90. Hercules, Inc. v. Walters, 434 So. 2d 723 (Miss. 1983); see also FED. R. EvID. 803(24).
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